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F A B R I C E  E D O U A R D  L E H O U C Q  
Abstract. Costa Rica's long-term standing as one of the few countries in Latin 
America with a stable democracy has prompted many to view its polity as an 
inevitable outcome of a racially homogeneous and relatively egalitarian society. 
Without ignoring the importance of sociological factors, this article contends that 
institutional arrangements played an equally important — if not more central — 
role in the development of a stable democratic regime in this country. The 
structure of Costa Rican presidentialism encouraged incumbents to maintain 
control of the state while it, as a consequence, incited the opposition to rebel 
against central state authorities. Political competition became more peaceful as 
parties that failed to hold or to capture the presidency were nevertheless 
compensated by being allowed to occupy legislative seats. 
Along with Chile and Uruguay, Costa Rica is a country where a 
nineteenth-century republican system was gradually transformed into a 
fully-fledged democracy. At different times during the nineteenth century, 
politicians in these countries began to eschew the use of violence to obtain 
control of the state. As they began to compete for public offices in 
regularly scheduled elections, they also negotiated agreements to expand 
the franchise and to curtail the practice of electoral fraud. Why did 
politicians in Costa Rica decide to respect the results of the ballot box? 
Why did they create stable democratic institutions?  
Prevailing interpretations contend that the democratisation of the 
Costa Rican polity was inevitable. Some focus on the alleged democratic 
nature of Costa Rican political culture. Others argue that democracy was 
a product of a relatively egalitarian class structure in a population which 
was homogeneous and/or had a reasonable level of economic de - 
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velopment. All assume that the characteristics of Costa Rican society are 
the causes of political behaviour. 
The validity of these explanations, however, is premised upon an 
inaccurate portrait of Costa Rican politics. Until well into the twentieth 
century, most presidents in Costa Rica had come to power through the 
force of arms or in elections marred by fraud and violence. Only eight out 
of the forty-eight presidents between 1824 and 1949, for example, came to 
power in competitive and fair elections.1 Even without being wracked by 
the ethnic and class cleavages experienced by so many societies, the very 
struggle to retain or to gain control of the state has generated the discord 
responsible for the outbreak of violence and fraud and even regime 
breakdown in Costa Rica. 
This article argues that a society with a great deal of underlying 
consensus does not inevitably lead to the consolidation of a democratic 
regime. Without ignoring the importance of economic and sociological 
factors, I contend that constitutional arrangements and the nature of 
political institutions play an equally important — if not more central — role 
in the development of stable democratic regimes. Like many other 
institutionalists, my article focuses upon how strategic behaviour is 
shaped by institutions and how such behaviour in turn can transform 
existing political arrangements.2 And, like other analysts of presidential 
forms of government, I show how the structure of executive—legislative 
relations can exert a powerful impact upon political stability.3 
1 James L. Busey, ' The Presidents of Costa Rica', The Americas, vol. 18, no. 1 (1961).  
2 I am echoing the claims made by Arturo Valenzuela and John Peeler that the choices  
made by politicians shaped the democratic trajectories of countries like Chile and Costa  
Rica. I build upon this observation by showing how the behaviour of politicians was  
decisively influenced by the incentives generated by prevailing institutional arr ange-  
ments. See John A. Peeler, Latin American Democracies: Colombia, Costa Rica and  
Venezuela (Chapel Hill ,  1984) and especially Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel  
Valenzuela, ' Los orígenes de la democracia : reflexiones teóricas sobre el caro de Chile',  
Estudios Públicos (Santiago de Chile), No. 13 (spring 1983). Works within the genre of  
the new institutionalisim include: Robert H. Bates, Beyond the Miracle of the Market: The  
Political Economy of Agrarian Development in Kenya (Cambridge, 1989); Gary W. Cox, The  
Efficient Secret: The Cabinet and the Development of Political Parties in Victorian England  
(Cambridge, 1987) and Charles Stewart, III, Budget Reform Politics: The Design of the  
Appropriations Process in the House of Representatives (Cambridge, 1989). The most recent  
theoretical discussions of the new institutionalism are Jack Knight, Institutions and Social  
Conflict (Cambridge, 1992) and George Tsebelis, Nested Games: Rational Choice in  
Comparative Politics (Berkeley, 199o). 
3 Though, I must add, I do not examine how electoral laws and party systems generate 
dividied governments. Here, I focus upon the consequences of an omnipotent 
presidency on democratic stability. The most thorough discussion of the prior set of 
issues are : Mark P. Jones, Electoral Laws and the Survival of Presidential Democracies 
(Notre Dame, 1995); Juan Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), The Failure of Presidential 
Democracy (Baltimore, 1994) and Matthew Soberg Shugart and John M. Carey, 
Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge, 199z). 
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My principal aims are, first, to offer an institutions-based interpretation 
of the development of democracy in Costa Rica. I show how the gradual 
development of respect for the results of the ballot box was a product 
of a series of conflicts between incumbents and their opponents to define 
the powers of the executive branch of government. By doing so, I 
suggest that a shift be made to much more overtly political accounts 
of the development of democracy in Costa Rica in which individual actions 
— as well as their institutional determinants — are recognised, dissected 
and explained. 
Secondly, I also identify the implications of such an explanation for 
comprehending the role played by institutional arrangements in political 
development, both in and outside of Latin America. As the Costa Rican 
case illustrates, the struggle for state power itself can often generate severe 
partisan cleavages and thus prevent the development of democratic 
institutions. Explaining the democratisation of a political system thus, 
requires showing how institutional arrangements shape the pursuit of 
state power and how this struggle itself forges the institutionality of the 
state. 
The first section of the article evaluates the usefulness of existing, 
largely sociological ways of explaining the development of a democratic 
regime in Costa Rica. I then discuss the institutional foundations of 
presidential power and delineate the trend towards more democratic 
forms of government since the late nineteenth century. In the final 
section, I identify the implications of my analysis for existing accounts 
of the democratisation of the Costa Rican polity and for prevailing 
discussions of the origins of different regime types in Latin America. 
The origins of democracy in Costa Rica: explanations and evidence 
Most foreign and domestic observers concur that the distinctiveness of 
Costa Rican politics stems from its atypical experience during the colonial 
period. The absence of large numbers of resident Indians and the lack of 
mineral resources made Costa Rica unattractive for extensive Spanish 
settlement. Unlike other parts of the Spanish Empire, Costa Rica was 
underpopulated as well as poor for most of its history. Those who did live 
in colonial Costa Rica, according to these views of Costa Rican history, 
developed a rural egalitarian society that proved to be an ideal foundation 
for democratic government.4
 
4. Perhaps the most influential version of this thesis remains that of Carlos Monge Alfaro, 
Historia de Costa Rica (San Jose, 1966). Other notable examples include: Oscar Aguilar 
Bulgarelli, Ensayos de la historia patria (San José, 1984); José Albertazzi Avendaño, 
'Linos apuntes simples sobre la democracia costarricense', Don José Albertazzi y la 
democracia costarricense (San José, 1987 [originally published in 1940]); Eugenio 
 
332 Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq  
Echoing the arguments first made by Barrington Moore, others argue 
that Costa Rica's uncommon political trajectory is the product of a class 
structure spawned by the cultivation of coffee since the mid-nineteenth 
century.5 The scarcity of labour, along with the abundance of land, fuelled 
the growth of a large class of small and medium-sized property-holders 
who both cultivated coffee for export and participated in the emerging 
rural wage economy. Unlike the rest of Central America, these analysts 
point out, large landlords in Costa Rica did not have to compel the rural 
workforce to work on their estates. Without the need for coercion, 
landlords did not have to pressure public officials to create the security 
forces necessary to maintain a steady supply of labour and to repress 
peasants, workers and others who threatened their control over the state. 
Though I am questioning the claim that the development of an open, 
competitive political system springs from such a society, it is clear that 
Costa Rican rural relations have not been characterised by large-scale 
conflicts between landlords and a large mass of landless peasants. Class 
struggle instead took the form of a series of conflicts between what is  
Rodríguez Vega, Apuntes para una sociología costarricense (San Jose, 1979 [originally 
published in 1953]) ; José Francisco Trejos, Origeny desarrollo de la democracia en Costa 
Rica (San José, 1939). Useful surveys include Chester J. Zelaya, Democracia con 
justicia social y libertad ', in Chester J. Zelaya (ed.), Democracia en Costa Rica? cinco 
opinions polémicas (San José, 1983) as well as Marc Edelman and Joanne Kenen, La 
culture politique du Costa Rica', Les Temps Moderns, No. 517-518 (August/September 
1989). The principal English-language proponents of this explanation are James L. 
Busey, Notes on Costa Rican Democracy (Boulder, 196z); Charles D. Ameringer, 
Democracy in Costa Rica (New York, 1982); John A. Booth, ' Costa Rica: The Roots of 
Democratic Stability', in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz and Seymour Martin Lipset 
(eds.), Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America (Boulder, 1989); Samuel Z. 
Stone, The Heritage of the Conquistadors (Lincoln, 1991). 
5 Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in 
the Making of the Modern World (Boston, 1966). For a similar sort of study with a larger 
sample of cases, see Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens and John 
D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Chicago, 1992). For Moorean 
interpretations of Central America, see Enrique Baloyra-Herp, 'Reactionary Despotism 
in Central America', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 15, no. z (1983); Lowell 
Gudmundson, ' Lord and Peasant in the Making of Modern Central America', in 
Evelyne Huber Stephens and John Stephens (eds.), Agrarian Structure and Political Power 
in the Period of Export Expansion (Pittsburgh, forthcoming); David Kauck, 'Agricultural 
Commercialization and State Development in Central America : The Political Economy 
of the Coffee Industry from 1838 to 1940 unpubl. Ph.D. disc.,  University of 
Washington, 1988; Jeffrey Paige, ' Coffee and Politics in Central America', in Richard 
Tardanico (ed.), Crisis in the Caribbean Basin (Beverly Hills, 1987); Hector Perez 
Brignoli, Crecimiento agroexportador y reg ímenes políticos en Centroamérica : un 
ensayo de Historia comparada', in Hector Perez Brignoli and Mario Samper (eds.), 
Tierra, café y sociedad: Ensayos sobre la Historia agraria centroamericana (San José, 1994); 
John Weeks, 'An Interpretation of the Central American Past', Latin American Research 
Review, vol. 21, no. 3 (1986). 
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often labelled a `rural middle class' and the owners of coffee exporting 
firms (beneficiadores) over the price paid at harvest time by the latter to the 
former. The magnitude and frequency of rural protest began a long-term 
decline by the early 1930s, when small and medium-sized coffee growers 
settled their differences with coffee  exporting firms by creating a 
government agency to regulate the price of coffee.6 Though the number 
of landless peasants has steadily increased since the late nineteenth 
century,7 they — or urban-based artisans and workers — never became the 
basis of powerful counter-hegemonic social movements.8
 
Neither have other destabilising cleavages emerged in Costa Rica. The 
secularisation of political authority in the late nineteenth century did not 
trigger a long-lasting conflict between opponents and proponents of an 
important role for the Roman Catholic Church in public affairs.9 Though 
civil and religious authorities did clash in the 1870s and 1880s, this 
struggle only briefly contributed to shaping patterns of party behaviour 
before dissipating by the turn of the century. And, despite the presence of 
an Afro-Caribbean population in the Atlantic Coast Province of Limón, 
the racial homogeneity of most Costa Ricans living in the central valley 
has prevented the emergence of virulent and ethnically based politics in 
this country.10
 
It is precisely this generalised social consensus that is responsible for the 
widely held view that the democratisation of the Costa Rican polity was 
unavoidable. While the absence of long-term, simmering disputes has 
reduced the number and intensity of social and economic cleavages, Costa 
Rican politicians have often disregarded the results of the ballot box. They 
may have failed to transform social and economic conflicts into enduring 
partisan cleavages, but they turned the struggle for state power into a 
series of strife-torn clashes and occasionally bloody confrontations.  
Until the late nineteenth century, for example, most chief executives 
were selected in essentially non-competitive (and indirect) elections or 
6 Víctor Hugo Acuña Ortega, Patrones del conflicto social en la econom ía cafetalera 
costarricense (1900-1948) Revista de Ciencias Sociales (San José), no. 31 (March 1986). 
7. Lowell Gudmundson, ' Peasant, Farmer, Proletarian : Class Formation in a Smallholder 
Economy, 1850-1950', Hispanic American Historical Review, vol. 69, no. z (May 1989) 
and Mitchell A. Seligson, Peasants of Costa Rica and the Development of Agrarian 
Capitalism (Madison, 198o). 
8. Víctor Hugo Acuña 0. and Iván Molina Jimenez, Historia económica y social de Costa Rica 
(San José, 1991). 
9 Claudio Vargas, El liberalism", la Iglesia y el Estado en Costa Rica (San José, 1991). 
10 See Philippe I. Bourgois, Ethnicity at Work: Divided Labor on a Central American Banana 
Plantation (Baltimore, 1989); Aviva Chomsky, 'A Perfect Slavery:' West Indian Workers 
and the United Fruit Company in Costa Rica, 1870-19f" (Baton Rouge, forthcoming) and 
Trevor Purcell, Banana Fallout: Class, Color, and Culture among the West Indians in Costa 
Rica (Berkeley, 1993). On the relation betweem ethnicity and political instability, see : 
Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley, 1985). 
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assumed office as legal designates for brief periods of time. Seven chief 
executives in Costa Rica came to power through the force of arms, one of 
whom constructed a dictatorship that lasted nearly a dozen years. Two 
presidents had the misfortune of being summarily executed after having 
become the victims of coups. Only one chief executive was chosen in a 
competitive election while all others assumed power as legal designates 
for brief periods of time or were selected in essentially non-competitive 
elections. 
Only in the aftermath of Tomás Guardia's dictatorship (1870-82) did 
politicians begin to rely upon the ballot box to select key public 
officials. As Figure 1 shows, seventeen presidents have been selected in 
fair and competitive elections since the late nineteenth century. Four 
others have assumed office as a result of extra-constitutional arrangements 
reached by parties in the aftermath of inconclusive elections. Five chief 
executives have been appointed as legal designates. 
Even as Costa Rican presidents increasingly have become selected in 
fair and competitive elections, the struggle to hold or to maintain 
control of the executive branch of government has not always remained 
peaceful. Since 1882, outgoing presidents have imposed their successors 
on at least six different occasions. During the same period also, 
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authorities — three of which succeeded in installing a new incumbent in 
the presidency. Disputes regarding the results of the 1948 presidential 
elections became so intense that a faction of the opposition started a civil 
war that led to the death of between I,000 and 1,300 individuals.11 The 
use of violence and fraud to capture state power only declined in the 
aftermath of the 1948 civil war. 
The causal validity of existing, largely sociological accounts of 
democratisation in Costa Rica is also placed in doubt by political 
developments in two other Latin American countries. Despite living in a 
largely agrarian economy characterised by oppressive class relations, 
politicians in Chile began to compete for state power within the electoral 
arena by mid-nineteenth century. Until Pinochet's rise to power in a coup 
in 1973,    Chileans had lived in perhaps one of the most long-lasting 
democratic regimes in the world.12 The utility of these approaches also is 
placed in doubt by their inability to explain why democratic practices have 
failed to endure during the twentieth century in Argentina, a country long 
possessing the attributes of modernity.13
 
Comparative evidence, along with the behaviour of Costa Rican 
politicians, suggests that consensual social structures do not automatically 
produce democratic regimes. The absence of multiple and divisive 
cleavages may facilitate, but does not guarantee, cooperation among 
politicians. Explaining the development of democratic institutions thus 
requires shifting away from establishing linkages between social 
conditions and political outcomes to explaining why politicians decide to 
comply with the results of the ballot box. 
Presidentialism and political competition 
By focusing on the behaviour of individuals, I do not suggest that the 
cultural or sociological characteristics of politicians encourage them to 
comply with democratic institutions. That many Costa Ricans acknowl-
edged as well as disregarded the results of the ballot box underscores the 
limited utility of norm-based explanations of political behaviour. I also 
refrain from speculating on the role played by cultural values in decision- 
making because of the difficulty of measuring the importance of a norm  
11. John W. Gardner, ' The Costa Rican Junta of 1948-49', unpubl. Ph.D. diss., St John's University, 
1971, pp. 54-5. Data on presidential succession during this period are from Fabrice Edouard 
Lehoucq, ' The Origins of Democracy in Costa Rica in Comparative Perspective', unpubl. 
Ph.D. diss., Duke University, 1992, pp. 63-7o. Data on the period prior to 1882 are from Busey, 
' The Presidents of Costa Rica '. 
12 Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, ' Los orígenes de la democracia'. 
13. H. Waisman, Reversal of Development in Argentina: Postwar Counterrevolutionary  
Policies and their Structural Consequences (Princeton, 1987), pp. 94-126. 
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to a person (or a group) without relying upon observations of her (or 
their) behaviour.14 Recent efforts to circumvent these methodological 
limitations conclude that cultural attitudes do not decisively influence 
whether a democratic regime does or does not emerge.15
 
To make sense of the choices made by politicians, this article builds 
upon the central premises of rational choice analysis.16 It assumes that 
politicians want to hold office to shape public policy. It also presupposes 
that the rules governing access to state offices generate incentives for them 
to act in fairly predictable ways. Both assumptions generate the 
proposition that the decision to respect the results of the ballot box is a 
product of strategic and institutional constraints. Unable to impose their 
rule on their rivals, politicians settle for what they can get and not what 
they want. 
In what follows, I pursue an inductive strategy to identify the 
conditions that prompt incumbents and their adversaries to respect and to 
build democratic institutions. I begin by indicating how the structure of 
the Costa Rican political system undermined the very cooperation its 
constitution ostensibly aimed to foment.  
The institutional preponderance of the Costa Rican presidency 
The importance of the presidency in Costa Rican political life stemmed 
from its policy-making pre-eminence and its control of key bureaucratic 
instruments. Though the 1871 constitution stipulated that all laws needed 
both executive and legislative approval, it undercut the autonomy of 
Congress as it endowed the president with a number of exceptional 
powers.17 The constitution only permitted the Congress to hold ordinary  
14 See Michael Hechter, Principles of Group Solidarity (Berkeley, 1987), esp. pp. 3-6 and 
Adam Przeworski, Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 19-37. 
15 Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, ' Civic Culture and Democracy : The 
Question of Causal Relationships ', American Political Science Review), vol. 88, no. 3 
(September 1994). 
16 See especially Tsebelis, Nested Games and Barbara Geddes, ' Uses and Limitations of 
Rational Choice ', in Peter H. Smith (ed.), Latin America in Comparative Perspective: New 
Approaches to Methods and Analysis (Boulder, 199 5 ). Two other analysts, whose work has 
influenced my own, use a similar set of assumptions to answer somewhat different 
questions. They are Barry Ames, Political Survival: Politicians and Public Polity in Latin 
America (Berkeley, 1987) and Barbara Geddes, Politician's Dilemma: Building State 
Capacity in Latin America (Berkeley, 1994). 
17 I refer to the unreformed version of the 1871 constitution unless I state otherwise. I 
rely upon the version of the 1871 constitution contained in Marco Tulio Zeled ón, 
Digesto constitucional de Costa Rica (San José, 1946), pp. 207-24. It also is reprinted in 
Hernán G. Peralta, Las constituciones de Costa Rica (Madrid, 1962). The 1949 constitution 
is discussed below. 
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sessions during three months of the year. It empowered the president to 
call extraordinary sessions of the legislature to consider issues of its 
choosing throughout the remaining months of the year. The president was 
allowed to convene the Permanent Commission, a quasi-legislative body 
composed of five deputies selected by their colleagues, to seek temporary 
approval of emergency decrees when Congress was not in session. These 
attributes furnished chief executives with the capacity to revoke individual 
guarantees by suspending the constitutional order. 
Effective control of three ministries determined whether presidents 
would finish their terms in office. The Ministry of Public Works was a 
source of jobs that presidents manipulated to reward local authorities for 
their political loyalty. Through the Ministry of the Interior (Gobernación), 
presidents controlled the provincial as well as cantonal (municipal) 
administration of the republic. From within this Ministry, they also named 
the officials who registered voters, who selected members of local polling 
stations and who tallied the votes on election day. By selecting the officers 
and staff of the Ministry of Public Security (named the Ministry of War 
and Navy until 1923), presidents also protected their regimes, defended 
national sovereignty and possessed the coercive authority to enforce the 
laws of the state. Political competition, in a system that endowed the 
executive branch of government with such powers, thus revolved around 
either retaining or acquiring control of the presidency. 
The President's dilemma: to hold or not to hold fair elections 
According to the 1871 constitution, incumbents could not run for office 
until another individual had exercised the powers of the presidency for the 
four-year term following their own. Candidates were obliged to attract the 
support of more than 50 per cent of the vote to be named president. 
Should no one succeed in doing so, members of the new Congress were 
empowered to select the president on 1  May from among the two 
individuals receiving the two largest pluralities of the vote.18
 
18 In lieu of popularly elected vice-presidents, legislative deputies selected three 
presidential designates during the first session of the new Congress. An amendment to 
the constitution in 1926 established double-ballot elections for the presidency : should 
no candidate receive an absolute majority of the popular vote, the old Congress on 
March was to have convened a run-off election among the two candidates who 
attracted the most votes. In 1936, another constitutional reform decreed that a 
candidate needed to attract the largest plurality and only 4o per cent of the popular vote 
to have been declared president. In the event that no candidate should satisfy these 
requirements, a run-off election, announced by the old Congress on 1 March, would 
have been held among the two leading candidates during the first Sunday of the 
following April. 
The 1949 Constitution abolished the system of congressionally elected presidential 
designates and created the office of the vice-presidency. Since 19 .53, two vice-presidents 
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Despite constitutional provisions aiming to ensure the rotation of 
public offices among political forces, the centrality of the presidency in 
public affairs encouraged incumbents to retain state power. Relinquishing 
control of the presidency would result in the loss of control over state 
patronage and, more generally, their ability to enact policies beneficial for 
their constituents. Most importantly, defeat in a presidential election 
would deprive incumbents of control over the electoral process. Upon 
yielding power, they could become targets of persecution and would have 
few guarantees that their rivals would hold equally fair elections. The very 
attributes that made holding the presidency so desirable thus led to the 
deformation of what was an ostensibly democratic constitution.  
The behaviour of Costa Rican politicians supports this model of 
political competition. Until well into the twentieth century, most 
presidents did not come to power in fair and competitive elections. As 
Figure i reveals, only five out of eighteen presidents between I882 and 
1938 were selected in non-fraudulent and open elections. During this same 
period, opposition factions organised twenty-one insurrections against 
central state authorities. 
Figure i also, however, shows that incumbents did begin to abstain 
from imposing themselves or their successors on the presidency. It reveals 
that members of the opposition began to desist from overthrowing 
governments. Increasingly larger numbers of presidents have come to 
power in free and competitive elections since the late nineteenth century. 
Why did Costa Rican politicians begin to eschew the use of force to retain 
or to gain control of the state? Why did they begin to comply with the 
results of the ballot box? 
Incumbents and opposition movements in Costa Rica began to find 
peaceful ways of choosing chief executives to prevent the chronic 
instability generated by the use of violence and fraud. Incumbents 
recognised that the abuse of presidential prerogatives increased the 
likelihood that their regimes might be overthrown. Opposition move-
ments gradually came to realise that most rebellions against central state 
authorities ended in failure, death and destruction. In these circumstances, 
compromise offered an attractive solution to regulating access to key 
public offices. 
Fear of being overthrown was not the only reason that incumbents or  
have been elected along with the president at four-year intervals. In 1969, legislators 
enacted a constitutional amendment prohibiting an individual  from ever being 
president for more than one four-year term. The only individuals exempted from this 
ban on re-election were those who had exercised the powers of the presidency before 
the 1949 constitution was amended to this effect. 
 
 
their adversaries began to participate in increasingly fair and competitive 
elections for the presidency. Unless incumbents were compensated for 
acknowledging their defeat at the polls, they were unlikely to relinquish 
control of the presidency. Similarly, if electoral defeat implied the absence 
of political influence, members of the opposition also were unlikely to 
refrain from attempting to topple the president. Incumbents, along with 
their adversaries, began to consider recognising the results of presidential 
elections once they were at least guaranteed access to other important  
public offices. 
Analysis of congressional electoral results and the timing of rebellions 
indicates that political competition tended to remain peaceful if those 
parties that failed to capture the presidency were nevertheless compensated 
by being allowed to occupy seats in Congress. Table 1 shows that the 
average share of legislators belonging to the president's party was 77 per 
cent during periods when the opposition attempted to overthrow the 
opposition on two different occasions. It fell to nearly 69 per cent during 
intervals when the opposition organised one insurrection against the 
government. The proportion dropped to slightly more than half of the  
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delegation sent to Congress during periods when the adversaries of the 
president refrained from using the force of arms to gain control of the 
state.19 
Data on the legislative strength of insurgents reveal that groups with 
a stake in the political system became dissuaded from organising 
insurrections against central state authorities. Figure 2 shows that the 
political forces that attempted to overthrow the president between 1890 
and 1948 only controlled a minority of legislative seats. With only a pair 
of exceptions, most possessed ten or less than 1  TO per cent of the delegation 
biennially sent to Congress. Few revolts were backed by legislators who 
also controlled the balance of power within Congress. Only the 
insurrections of 1930 and 1932 were led by individuals whose associates 
in the legislature could form majorities (of 53 and 70 per cent, respectively) 
with pro-government deputies. 
The evidence presented in this section suggests that democratic stability 
was a product of decisions made by incumbents and their opponents to 
share and not to monopolise state power. Under the threat of being 
overthrown, incumbents began to permit electoral competition to select 
the occupants of executive and legislative offices. The ability to send 
representatives to Congress also encouraged ruling and opposition 
parties to start respecting the results of the ballot box. Concerned with 
their political survival, incumbents and their rivals struck a bargain 
whose by- 
19 Legislative deputies have been elected from one of seven districts whose boundaries 
correspond to those of Costa Rica's seven provinces. Between 1882 and 1893, 
individuals who attracted the largest pluralities of votes in each district became 
Congressmen. Provinces that sent two or fewer representatives to Congress required 
candidates to gain absolute majorities between 1893 and 1913. Districts that elected 
three or more Congressmen allocated seats through proportional representation during 
this period. Between 1913 and 1946, provinces that sent two or fewer representatives 
to Congress required candidates to attract relative majorities of the vote. In those that 
sent three or more deputies to the legislature, a system of proportional representation 
was employed to distribute congressional seats. Since 1946, all deputies have been 
elected through the least remainders version of proportional representation in seven 
provincial electoral districts. 
Until 1948, congressional elections were held every two years for half of its 
members, each of whom served a four-year term in office. A constitutional prohibition 
against re-election for legislators only came into effect with the promulgation of the 
1949 constitution. Since 1949, all members of the newly named Legislative Assembly 
have been elected to four-year-terms that they serve co-terminously with that of the 
president. Legislative deputies may run for re-election, but are constitutionally 
required to wait for a period of four years before running for office. 
Electoral laws and their reforms were initially printed in the daily government 
newspaper, La Gaceta: Diario Oficial, and subsequently published in La Colección de 
Leyes y Decretos (San Jose, 1882—). Versions of electoral laws were also published as 
booklets ; they will be cited below. For a juridical analysis of the current law, see 
Ruben Hernández Valle, Derecho electoral costarricense (San Jose, 1989). 
 
 
product was the gradual increase in rates of compliance with democratic 
institutions. 
Institutional reform and the development of democratic stability 
This mutually beneficial arrangement depended upon the willingness of 
incumbents to exchange public office for political stability. The temptation 
always existed for incumbents to employ the powers of the presidency to 
influence the nature of electoral outcomes, especially if they believed they 
had more to gain from retaining rather than from relinquishing control of 
the executive. In a political system that endowed the presidency with so 
much authority, opposition movements held few guarantees that state 
officials would respect the rules of democratic political competition. 
Uncertainty and instability were largely unavoidable consequences of the 
1871 constitution. 
In such an environment, opposition parties focused upon preventing 
the president from enacting legislation without the approval of Congress 
and upon restricting his ability to manipulate electoral laws for partisan 
advantage. Tying the hands of the incumbent promised to facilitate the 
detection of all transgressions of previously negotiated agreements made 
between presidents and opposition forces. More importantly, doing so 
held out the possibility of increasing the number of opposition  
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representatives in Congress, from where anti-government forces could 
more effectively contest the authoritarian proclivities of standing 
presidents. 
The restructuring of political institutions, however, was difficult 
because most incumbents and majority parties proved unwilling to curtail 
the powers of their offices. Even when an incumbent favoured change, 
tendered reforms often needed the support of super-majoritarian 
legislative coalitions. Altering or creating laws regulating the powers of 
the presidency, for example, initially required endorsement by committee 
and, subsequently, approval by congressional majorities on three separate 
readings of the bill. In addition to following the rules governing the 
creation or alteration of ordinary laws, attempts to amend the constitution 
only succeeded after they had received the backing of two-thirds of all 
deputies in two different years of the legislative calendar. 
Yet, on a number of important occasions, reformist coalitions overcame 
the natural resistance of incumbents, majority party deputies and, in the 
case of electoral reform, those representing local machines, for whom 
support of genuine reform meant political suicide. Aided by handfuls of 
pro-government and independent depuities, presidents and their nominal 
opponents gradually succeeded in reducing the powers of the presidency. 
By endorsing far-reaching reforms, incumbents not only stabilised their 
regimes, but also created reputations for themselves as change-oriented 
politicians. Opposition legislators cooperated with presidents because 
doing so increased the likelihood that their parties would obtain control 
of key public offices. Acting together, they transformed the institutional 
landscape of Costa Rican politics.  
According to the 1871 constitution, presidents were entitled to convene 
the Permanent Commission to deliberate on matters requiring immediate 
attention during the nine months of the year when Congress was not in 
session. The five members of the Permanent Commission were selected by 
their colleagues at the end of the ordinary sessions of Congress. Its most 
important attribute consisted of the suspension of the constitutional order 
at the petition of the chief executive. When combined with the 
responsibility for organising and holding elections, the authority to 
convene the Permanent Commission furnished presidents with the power 
to prevent their opponents from capturing key public offices. 
Between 1882 and 1910 presidents declared states of siege on seventeen 
occasions, eleven with the endorsement of the Permanent Commission 
and five with the consent of Congress. Only on one opportunity did an 
incumbent unilaterally abrogate the constitutional order after he had 
illegally dissolved Congress. Presidents also used states of siege to 
suppress armed movements five out of the eleven times they gained the  
 
 
support of the Permanent Commission during this period. On three other 
occasions, presidents employed this device to jail and to exile their 
opponents. Table 2 summarises these results.  
Throughout most of this period, opposition parties retaliated by trying 
to topple successive governments. Their efforts forced President Rafael 
Iglesias Castro (1894-1902) — the only chief executive to succeed himself 
in office — to endorse, along with the moderate sector of the opposition, 
the compromise candidacy of Asención Esquivel Ibarra (1902-6). 
The fear that the president would employ the Permanent Commission 
to suspend the constitional order again became real towards the end of the 
campaign to select a new president and one-half of the members of 
Congress in 1906. Under the pretext that hardline opposition factions 
were plotting a coup against his government, Esquivel Ibarra obtained the 
support of the Permanent Commission to declare a state of siege on I 
March 1906. Deprived of their rights, large numbers of opposition 
electors were either coerced into voting for official candidates or thrown 
into jail. Through the use of violence and fraud, Cleto Gonzalez V íquez 
was installed in the presidency and furnished with a large congressional 
majority.20
 
Prevented from occupying executive and legislative offices, a movement 
led by leading Republicans attempted to capture the army barracks in 
Puntarenas and Liberia in the hopes of igniting a revolt against Gonzalez 
Víquez's regime.21 Though these insurgents failed to secure control of the 
barracks, their efforts did trigger what became a four-year period of 
20 Orlando Salazar Mora, El apogeo de la república liberal en Costa Rica (187o-1914) (San José, 
1990), pp. 211 -22. 
21 Octavio Quesada, Sumaria por sedition: noviembre, diciembre de 1906 (San José, 1906). 
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negotiations between the government and opposition about the nature 
and extent of presidential powers. Under the threat of being overthrown, 
President Gonzalez Víquez helped to reform electoral laws (discussed in 
the next section) and reluctantly began to consider opposition demands to 
abolish the Permanent Commission and to restrict the ability of the 
president to suspend the constitutional order.  
Efforts to change the constitution intensified in the wake of the 
Republican Party victory in the 1908 midterm elections, which sub -
stantially reduced the government's previously overwhelming majority in 
Congress. That forecasts of the approaching 1910 general elections 
suggested that the Republicans would win both the presidency and a 
majority in Congress succeeded in encouraging many gonzalista deputies to 
abandon backing all government policies. Along with favourable electoral 
trends, compromise on the proposed reforms allowed the opposition 
Republicans to fashion a coalition in support of their proposed 
constitutional reforms.22
 
Faced with a two-thirds congressional majority in favour of con-
stitutional change, President González Víquez endorsed the Republican- 
inspired project calling for the dismantling of the Permanent Commission 
and for restricting the ability of the chief executive to declare states-of-
siege. Henceforth, the president's decision to suspend the constitution 
when Congress was in recess also entailed the holding of an extraordinary 
session of Congress within forty-eight hours of the date of such a decree. 
Through a simple majority of votes, the emergency meeting of Congress 
then became empowered to cancel the order announcing a state-of-siege. 
In the aftermath of the Republican Party's overwhelming victory at the 
polls a year later, the tendered reforms were promulgated during the 
initial year of Jimenez Oreamuno's first term in office (1910— 14).23
 
Limiting presidential discretion: the reform of electoral laws  
Electoral reform was the other objective pursued by critics of presidential 
power in Costa Rica. Unlike the struggle to abolish the Permanent 
Commission, however, opposition to institutional change did not stem 
solely from the unwillingness of incumbents and pro-government 
legislators to relinquish their ability to suspend the constitutional order  
22 Lehoucq, ' The Origins of Democracy in Costa Rica in Comparative Perspective', pp. 
88-9z. Unless otherwise stated, data on the partisan affiliation of deputies are from 
Table 1. 23 
23. Orlando Salazar Mora, 'La Comisión Permanente y la suspension del orden 
constitutional', Revista de Ciencias juridicas (San José, Costa Rica), No. 44 (May—August 
1981), pp. 45-7. 
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for partisan advantage. Politicians belonging to locally based political 
machines, for whom fairer electoral practices represented political suicide, 
also blocked efforts to purge electoral laws of fraud-ridden procedures. 
Under the threat of being deposed, a handful of change-oriented 
incumbents fashioned an alliance of convenience with important elements 
of the opposition to prevent the armed confrontations that both wished 
to avoid. Helped by small numbers of pro-government and independent 
deputies who preferred stability to civil war, reformist incumbents and 
their rivals transformed key institutions in the hopes of improving their 
ability to capture larger shares of state power.  
The 1871 constitution restricted suffrage rights to men at least twenty 
years old who, because of property or employment, had an adequate 
standard of living or to men at least eighteen years old who were either 
married or ' professors of some science'. It also stipulated that presidential 
and congressional elections were public and indirect : citizens voted for 
electors who subsequently cast ballots for the president and for legislative 
deputies in provincial electoral colleges.24
 
The 1871 constitution ostensibly empowered both the executive and 
legislative branches of government with the responsibility of certifying 
electoral results. For example, it furnished Congress with the responsibility 
of ensuring that presidents were chosen in accordance with constitutional 
precepts and decided whether newly elected deputies joined its ranks. The 
pre-eminence of the chief executive in electoral matters, however, was a 
product of the fact that most procedures of electoral administration were 
delineated by a specialised body of law. The president's ability to name the 
officials responsible for producing lists of voters, for holding elections and 
for tallying the vote thus stemmed from these electoral laws.  
Electoral reforms were not seriously discussed and enacted until the 
reformist presidency of Gonzalez Víquez (1906—10).25 After defeating an 
insurrection against his government in November 1906, the president and 
his Republican adversaries, over the next three years, passed three major 
sets of reforms of the 1893 Law of Elections. Henceforth, the president of  
24 A constitutional reform in 1913 eliminated indirect elections for a ll public officials. The 
1949 National Constituent Assembly made the franchise universal to include all male 
and female Costa Ricans above the age of twenty. A constitutional amendment in 1971 
lowered the voting age to eighteen. 
25 The electoral law then in effect was enacted in the early 189os. See: 'Ley de elecciones  
Nov. 1893)% Decretos relatives a elecciones: instrucciones para practicar las de segundo 
grado, conforme al sistema de voto proporcional numéricoy division territorial electoral (San José, 
1893). Discussions of its legal provisions include: Nelson Chacón Pacheco, Reseña de 
nuestras leges electorales (San José, 1975) and Orlando Salazar Mora, 'El sistemas electoral 
costarricense: un análisis del período 1889-1919', Avances de Investigación, No. zo, 
Centro de Investigaciones Históricas, Universidad de Costa Rica (San José, 1986). 
 
346 Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq 
provincial Electoral Assemblies was to be chosen by lot from among six 
candidates nominated by the Supreme Court of Justice. The presence of 
opposition party representatives (fiscales) on all electoral juntas, each of 
whom was entitled to supervise all election procedures and to file 
complaints regarding the fairness of electoral results (demandes de nulidad), 
undercut the power of presidential appointees to manipulate results for 
partisan advantage.26
 
The 1913 Law of Elections 
Encouraged by the first Republican president of Costa Rica, Ricardo 
Jimenez Oreamuno (1910-14), ten deputies proposed that all elected 
officials be chosen in direct elections by citizens through the secret 
franchise.27 Along with increasing the safeguards held by opposition 
parties, this project aimed to eliminate the period of time between first and 
second stage elections that frequently generated the instability prompting 
presidents to suspend the constitutional order. 
Even if they possessed the support of the president, these reforms could 
be blocked by one-third of the total membership of Congress. Though the 
Republicans had done extraordinarily well in the 1910 elections, only 
about half of the 41 deputies belonged to the jimenista faction of the party. 
The remaining Republican deputies were loyal to Deputy Fernández 
Alvarado, a politician long feared by his opponents because of the 
powerful political machine he directed.28 Even after the 1912 mid-term 
elections, when the jimenistas captured 13 of the 22 seats subject to 
competition, the president could only count upon the support of 23 of the 
41 deputies in Congress. 
Opposed by a coalition of machine politicians, most of the tendered 
constitutional reforms failed to muster the two-thirds legislative support 
(29 out of 41 deputies) required for initial passage of all such bills. By a 
vote of 24 to 18, the secret franchise was defeated on 4 June 1912 and thus 
failed to obtain the support necessary to be forwarded to next year's 
session of Congress.29 Only the measure eliminating two-stage elections 
for the presidency and for legislatures succeeded in garnering the 
support of a sufficiently large number of deputies. Slightly less than a year 
26  They were 'Ley No. 28 (1 Dec. 1908) ',  'Ley No.  3o (zz May 1909) ',  'Ley No. 73 (26 
June 1909) '.  All reforms of the 1893 Law of Elections in effect for the 1910 general 
elections are included in Compilación sabre Leyes de Elecciones (June 1909) (San Jose, 
1909) .  27  `Proyec to ( June  i910) ' ,  La Gaceta ,  No.  137 (8  Ju ly 1910) ,  p .  z8 .  
28  Orlando Salazar Mora, Máximo Fernández (San José,  1975). Unless otherwise stated, 
data on the partisan affiliation of deputies are from Table  
29  Constitutional Congress, Ordinary Session No. zz (4 June 1912), article 5, La Gaceta, 
No. 131 (13 June 1912), p. 713.  
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later, a two-thirds legislative majority approved this reform after it was 
endorsed and returned by the president to Congress.30
 
Despite the failure of these projects, President Jimenez Oreamuno sent 
Congress a new Law of Elections in the Spring of 1913. Seeking to avoid 
the need to garner the support of a two-thirds legislative majority 
required by constitutional amendments, Jimenez Oreamuno's project 
proposed that literate citizens could vote secretly and those who were not 
would vote publicly. Though Congress enacted a new electoral law later 
that year, deputies stripped Jimenez Oreamuno's electoral reform bill of 
its system of mixed voting.31 The principal innovations of the 1913 
Law of Elections consisted of the modernisation of the safeguards 
protecting the interests of opposition parties initially enacted during the 
presidency of Gonzalez Víquez (1906—10).32 
The 1925 and 1927 electoral reforms 
Opponents of electoral fraud only succeeded in establishing the secret 
franchise somewhat more than a decade later. Reform-oriented politicians 
were able to transform electoral laws because they exploited the 
advantages furnished by a peculiar balance of power between the 
executive and legislative branches of government. 
No party had obtained the constitutionally required absolute majority 
of the popular vote in the 1924 elections. In line with existing 
constitutional statutes, Congress became responsible for selecting the new 
president from among the two candidates who had polled the largest 
number of votes. The selection of Alberto Echandi Montero of the 
Agricultural Party (37 per cent of the popular vote) or of Jimenez 
Oreamuno of the Republican Party (42 per cent of the popular vote) 
hinged upon the final tally of legislative results. In a manoeuvre lambasted 
by the Agricultural Party, two Provincial Electoral Juntas — controlled 
by the Republicans and its new found ally, the Reformist Party — tallied 
the popular vote in such a way as to deny this party control of an outright 
majority in Congress. An alliance of the Republican and Reformist 
legislators then selected Jimenez Oreamuno to become president."  
30 Constitutional Congress, Ordinary Sessions No. i  i  (15 May 1913), article 6, La Gaceta, 
No. I 14 (21 May 1913),  p. 6o5. These reforms were published as  Decreto no.  7 (17 
May 1913)',  La Gaceta, No. 128 (7 June 1913), pp. 673 -4. 
31 Dictamen de la Comisión de Legislación (zo June 1913) ', La Gaceta, No. 146 (z8 June 
1 9 1 3),  PP.  773 - 4.  
32 'Ley de elecciones (7 August 1913)', Colección de Leyes y Decretos (San José, 1913). 
33 Ram írez A. ,  Jorge Volio y la revolución viviente (San José ,  1989),  pp.  112 -46; 
Marina Volio K., Jorge Volio y el Partido Reformista (San José, 1973), pp. 174-230. The 
la t t e r  i s  a  daugh ter  of  the  lat e Jorge  Vol io  J imenez ,  who was  the  leader  of  the 
Reformist Party. 
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A group of Agricultural Party deputies, two months later, presented 
their colleagues with a set of electoral reforms — thought just extensive 
enough to prevent the sort of fraud that had recently deprived their 
candidate of the presidency.34 Later that year, President Jimenez 
Oreamuno responded by endorsing their effort to reform electoral laws. 
He, however, stated that he could only support an electoral reform bill 
that also created the secret franchise, extended suffrage rights to women 
and established a Civic Registry for the purposes of determining who 
could and who could not vote. He also suggested that the president 
should not be entrusted with the power 'to interpret dark passages of 
electoral law ', so as to prevent the president from becoming `a grand 
elector, whom parties illegitimately attempt to persuade to interfere in the 
electoral process or to attack when they fail to enlist the president as an 
instrument of their interests ‘.35
 
Even though neither Jimenez Oreamuno nor the Agricultural Party 
possessed an outright legislative majority, such reforms stood a much 
better chance of being enacted during the mid-1920s than during Jimenez 
Oreamuno's first term as president. Both the presi dent and the 
Agricultural Party no doubt realised that electoral reform would be 
opposed by a sizeable coalition of deputies from all parties that belonged 
to locally based political machines. The president's ability to veto 
legislation he disliked forced Agricultural Party deputies either to endorse 
electoral reforms that included their proposals or to settle for no reform 
whatsoever. The Agricultural Party's threat to abstain from participating 
in the 1926 mid-term elections should Congress not enact any reforms also 
prompted Republican and Reformist deputies to support the project 
sponsored by 'the president and the Agricultural Party.36 Few preferred 
political instability to reform, especially deputies whose political careers 
did not hinge upon support from majority parties or from political 
machines. 
Unlike during his first presidency, Jimenez Oreamuno succeeded in 
fashioning legislative coalitions to enact important electoral laws in 1925 
and 1927 because many within the Agricultural Party also supported 
electoral reform — though initially of a minor sort. By threatening to veto 
bills that did not incorporate his far-reaching proposals, President 
Jimenez Oreamuno obliged the opposition to join pro-government and 
34 Proyecto (16 June 1924) ’, La Gaceta, No. 142 (29 June 1924).  
35 `Importante carta del Presidente de la República acerca de la reforma de la Ley 
Electoral', Diario tie Costa Rica, No. 1592 (29 Oct. 1924), p. 
36. 'El partido agr ícola se abstiene de ocuparse en las próximas elecciones de 
diputados', La Tribuna (3 Feb. 1925), p. 
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neutral deputies not entirely dependent upon political machines for their 
election to Congress to enact a series of fundamental electoral reforms. In 
1925, Congress passed an electoral law that established the secret 
franchise, a registry of voters and the Grand Electoral Council (GCE) to 
supervise all aspects of electoral administration and to adjudicate 
conflicting interpretations of electoral law. Two years later, the 1927 Law 
of Elections replaced the system of party-supplied ballots favoured by 
machine politicians with a system centralising the production of ballots in 
the Ministry of the Interior and mandated the distribution of photographic 
identification cards for all citizens.37
 
The re-emergence of instability and the birth of the 1946 electoral code 
Despite these reforms, existing laws still permitted incumbents, majority 
parties and local political machines to bolster the electoral standing of 
candidates of their liking. Until the 1940s, governments relieved citizens 
of the requirement to exhibit photographic identification on election day. 
Along with the provision that allowed citizens to cast absentee ballots in 
districts where they were not residents (votos a computar), the lack of 
photographic identification spawned the development of electoral fraud 
that permitted governments and political machines to increase their levels 
of electoral support and to decrease those of their rivals. Estimates suggest 
that anywhere between 40,000 and 60,000 false identification cards — 
consisting of approximately a fourth to a third of the electorate — existed 
by the mid-1940s.38
 
The inability of extant legislation to prevent presidents from distorting 
electoral outcomes permitted Calder& Guardia (1940-4), once his 
popularity began to wane, to exclude his opponents from gaining control 
of legislative and executives offices. The election of Picado Michalski to 
the presidency in 1944 was widely perceived as a product of Calderón 
Guardia's machinations, even if analysis of these electoral outcomes 
reveals that officially sponsored fraud may have contributed to, but may  
37`Se aprobó el dictamen sobre les objeciones del Ejecutivo a la Ley Electoral ', Diario 
de Costa Rica, No. 1804 (16 July 1925), p. 6. Ley de Elecciones (16 July 1925) (San Jose, 
1926). This version contains all subsequent reforms made of the 1925 law. For a 
description of this law, see Orlando Salazar Mora, 'La Ley electoral de 1925 Avances 
de Investigación, No. 21, Centro de Investigaciones Históricas, Universidad de Costa Rica 
(San José, 1986). An analysis of one of its key provisions is Rafael Villegas  El 
Registro Civil y el proceso electoral en Costa Rica', Estudios CIAPA (San Jose, Costa 
Rica), No. z-3 (1980). For the 1927 law, see: Hector Beeche (ed.), Ley de elecciones (z6 
Sept. 1927), (San José, 1931). 
38. Lehoucq, ' The Origins of Democracy in Costa Rica in Comparative Perspective', 
pp. 181, 318-19. 
 
350 Fabrice Edouard Lehoucq  
not have been responsible for, his electoral victory.39 Equally destabilising 
was the marginalisation of the opposition in Congress : between 1940 and 
1944, approximately three-fourths of all legislative seats were held by the 
governing National Republican Party and its ally, the Popular Vanguard 
Party. By upsetting the delicate balance of power responsible for 
maintaining political stability in Costa Rica, President Calderón Guardia 
provoked the formation of groups dedicated to the use of force to capture 
state power.40
 
Negotiation and institutional reform 
In the spring of 1945, Picado Michalski endorsed a bill aiming to eliminate 
the president's discretionary authority in electoral matters and to eradicate 
the ability of pro- as well as anti-government parties to manufacture 
fraudulent votes. The principal innovations of the proposed Electoral 
Code included replacing the GCE with the National Electoral Tribunal 
(TNE) and strengthening its authority to adjudicate conflicts regarding 
electoral matters and results. The creation of a new Electoral Registry also 
sought to prevent citizens from casting more than one ballot on election 
day by assembling an accurate list of individuals entitled to vote and by 
furnishing each citizen with a photographic identification card.  
President Picado Michalski succeeded in promulgating the Electoral 
Code by relying upon the support of a coalition of opposition and pro- 
government deputies as well as the votes of a small number of ca/deronista 
legislators. Locally based machine politicians in all parties, along with 
most calderonistra deputies, failed to defeat the proposed bill because 
enough congressmen believed that they could win in honest elections 
and/or that the consequences of legislative inaction were worse than those 
of fundamental reform. Reform of existing electoral laws in Costa Rica 
thus represented an exercise in damage control: important sectors of the 
ruling bloc recognised that ceding power to the opposition — the most 
39 Ibid. pp. 187 -94. 
40 A debate exists regarding the origins of the 1948 civil war. Manuel Rojas Bola ños, 
Lucha social y guerra civil en Costa Rica, 1940-1948 (San Jose, 1979) and Jacobo Schifter, 
La face oculta de la guerra civil (San José, 1979) argue that it was the product of class 
conflict and economic crises. Lehoucq suggests that the 1948 civil war was the outcome 
of a series of disputes between parties vying for control of the state (see his ' Class 
Conflict, Political Crisis and the Breakdown of Democratic Practices in Costa Rica : 
Reassessing the Origins of the 1948 Civil War', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 
23, no. 1 [Feb. 1991]). Whether the polarisation preceding the civil war was economic 
or political in inspiration does not matter for the discussion presented here. That it 
occurred and revolved around electoral guarantees for the opposition, however, is 
relevant. 
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likely effect of electoral reform — was preferable to heightened political 
uncertainty and the probable outbreak of civil war.41
 
The 1948 civil war 
Despite Picado Michalski's negotiation of mutually benefical agreements 
with the opposition, relations between the government and its adversaries 
nevertheless polarised. The death of Cortes Castro in March 1946 
decapitated opposition moderates. In their struggle to become leaders of 
the opposition, hardliners like Jose Figueres Ferrer and Otilio Ulate 
Blanco discredited all those who still wished to cooperate instead of 
confront Picado Michalski's government. Once Calderón Guardia 
declared his presidential candidacy for the 1948 election, the campaign of 
vilification against the government conducted by opposition hardliners 
persuaded key opposition moderates that compromise with Picado 
Michalski would only ensure that his predecessor would be elected 
president in 1948. 
The results of the 1948 presidential election indicated that the 
opposition's candidate, Ulate Blanco, had defeated Calderón Guardia. 
Marred by numerous irregularities, the outcome of the election was 
questioned by many calderonistas, who succeeded in annulling Ulate 
Blanco's victory in the session of Congress convened on I March to judge 
the validity of presidential electoral results. In the weeks that followed, 
efforts to negotiate a pact between pro- and anti-government forces 
became pointless once the army led by Figueres Ferrer won the civil war 
and, subsequently, organised a junta to rule Costa Rica for what 
eventually became a period of eighteen months.  
The reform of the 1871 constitution 
During the junta's rule, popularly elected delegates attended a convention 
to design a new constitution for Costa Rica. 4 2  Dominated by the  
41 This is the core conclusion of Lehoucq, `Institutional Change and Political Conflict : 
Evaluating Alternative Explanations of Electoral Reform in Costa Rica ', Electoral 
Studies, vol. 14, no. 1 (March 1995). With Iván Molina Jimenez, I am currently 
writing a manuscript, thanks to the generous support of the U.S. National Endowment for 
the Humanities, tentatively entitled, Fraud, Electoral Reform and Democracy: Costa Rica in 
Comparative Perspective, which will explore in much more detail the issues analysed in 
this section. 
42. See Oscar Aguilar Bulgarelli, La constitución de 1949: antecedentesy proyecciones (San José, 
2973); Mario Alberto Jimenez, Historia constitucional de Costa Rica (San Jose, 2979), pp. 154-
69. A discussion of each of the assembly debates is : Ruben Hernández Póveda, Desde la 
barra: como se discutió y emitió la Constitución Politica de r949 (San José, 1991 [originally 
published in 1953]). Hernández Póveda covered Assembly sessions as a reporter for the 
evening newspaper, La prensa libre. 
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representatives from Ulate Blanco's party, the National Constituent 
Assembly rejected the junta's draft constitution calling for a dramatic 
expansion of the role of the state in domestic affairs. Marginalised within 
the Constituent Assembly, pro-junta delegates failed to prevent a majority 
of convention participants from reducing the decree-making powers of 
the junta. Contrary to the wishes of the junta, the Constituent Assembly 
settled for restructuring the relations among the branches of government 
contained in the 1871 constitution.43
 
The 1949 Constituent Assembly strengthened the powers of the 
legislature as they reduced those of the executive branch of government 
by restricting the decree-making power of presidents to the execution of 
existing laws. It expanded the autonomy of the legislature by increasing 
to six the number of months the Legislative Assembly remained in 
ordinary sessions. During such periods, both the executive and legislative 
branches of government can send bills to the Assembly for discussion; 
during extraordinary sessions, in contrast, the chief executive convenes 
the Assembly and sets its agenda. The 1949 Constituent Assembly also 
adopted practices characteristic of parliamentary regimes : it empowered 
the Legislative Assembly to conduct interpellations of cabinet ministers 
and to subject them to censure, given two-thirds deputy support.44
 
The most innovative institution created by the Constituent Assembly is 
the Supreme Tribunal of Elections. To guarantee the sanctity of elections 
from partisan manipulation, the Supreme Tribunal of Elections is 
composed of three magistrates and three alternates, each of whom serves 
staggered, six-year terms and is elected by a two-thirds vote of the 
members of the Supreme Court of Justice. Made a branch of government 
equal to the other three in 1975, the Supreme Tribunal of Elections is 
solely responsible for calling elections, appointing members of all polling 
stations, interpreting all legal and constitutional provisions relating to 
electoral matters, investigating claims of illegal practices by officials, 
tallying the popular vote and declaring the winners of presidential, 
legislative and municipal elections.45
 
43. Gardner, ' The Costa Rican Junta of 1948 -9',  pp. 168-21o. 
44. See Wilburg Jimenez Castro, Génesis del gobierno de Costa Rica, 1821-101, vol. i (San 
Jose, 1986); Rose Marie Karpinski de Murillo, et al., Reflexiones sabre el Poder Legislativo 
costarricense (San José, 1989); Hugo Alfonso Muñoz Quesada, La Asamblea Legislativa 
en Costa Rica (San Jose, 1977) and Magda Ines Rojas, El Poder Ejecutivo en Costa Rica 
(San José, 198o). 
45. This pivotal institution has remained little studied. Existing essays are: Mauro Murillo, 
' El Tribunal Supremo de Elecciones', in Carlos José Gutierrez (ed.), Derecho 
constitucional costarricense (San José, 1983) and Rafael Villegas Antillón, ' El Tribunal 
Supremo de Elecciones y el Registro Civil de Costa Rica', Cuadernos de CAPEL, No. 18 
(San Jose, 1987). 
 
Democratic Cooperation in Costa Rica 3 5 3 
Conclusions 
Costa Rica's long-term standing as one of the few countries in Latin 
America with a stable democracy has prompted many observers to view 
its polity as a natural expression of a racially homogeneous and relatively 
egalitarian society. Though the absence of severe social and economic 
cleavages has helped to reduce the intensity of conflict in Costa Rican 
society, it remains unclear whether underlying social and economic 
consensus is responsible for the democratisation of this country's political 
system. Comparative analysis, for example, reveals that democratic 
regimes can emerge in societies — like Chile's — characterised by a highly 
unequal distribution of land and other resources and wracked by class 
conflict. 
Even if not confronted with troublesome counter-evidence, however, 
standard sociological approaches do not explain why incumbents and 
opposition movements have both respected and violated democratic 
practices in Costa Rica. Until the late nineteenth century, public officials 
came to power through force of arms or were selected in fraudulent, often 
hastily organised elections. It has only been since the turn of the century 
that politicians gradually began to eschew the use of force and to compete 
within the electoral arena for control of the state. The use of violence and 
fraud to capture state power only declined in the aftermath of the 1948 
civil war. 
This article argues that the structure of the political system created by 
the 1871 constitution was responsible for the instability that afflicted Costa 
Rican politics before the mid-twentieth century. The overwhelming 
importance of the presidency encouraged incumbents to retain state 
power and, as a result, left the opposition with few options but rebellion 
to affect the course of public policy. This cycle was broken in Costa Rica 
as incumbents, under the threat of being overthrown, desisted from 
retaining power or from imposing their successors on the presidency. 
Political competition also became more peaceful as those parties that failed 
to capture the presidency were nevertheless compensated by being allowed 
to occupy legislative offices. Compliance with the results of the ballot box 
was therefore a product of a set of decisions, made in an environment of 
chronic instability, to share control of the state.  
Another key finding of this analysis is that a democratic regime became 
consolidated in Costa Rica only once the institutional preponderance of 
the presidency was curtailed. Despite the strategic bargains struck between 
incumbents and their opponents, the threat of instability persisted until 
well into the twentieth century. Until the constitutional reforms of 1910, 
presidents bypassed Congress by convening the Permanent Commission 
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to enact legislation, especially to declare states of siege during electoral 
campaigns. Until the late 1940s, presidents manipulated the electoral arena 
for partisan advantage by appointing the officials responsible for the 
preparation of the registry of voters, for the organisation of polling 
stations and for the tally of the vote. 
The reform of Costa Rican presidentialism was, in part, a result of the 
decision made by incumbents seeking to defuse the threat posed by armed 
sectors of the opposition. Institutional changes also were a product of 
coalitions formed by pro-reform presidents and make-shift legislative 
majorities. Attempting to secure the survival of electoral institutions and 
their ability to triumph in fraud-free electoral contests, reformist 
incumbents and their legislative allies enacted constitutional and other 
institutional changes that damaged the ability of parties and/or locally 
based political machines to manipulate electoral laws for partisan 
advantage. Severe threats to political instability, along with a propitious 
balance of legislative power, thus permitted pro-reform politicans to 
reduce the powers held by the executive branch of government. 
What my analysis of the Costa Rican case also demonstrates is that the 
common practice of endowing chief executives with extraordinary powers 
has aggravated — if not created — conflict in the countries of Latin 
America. The power to declare states of siege unilaterally, or with minimal 
legislative consultation, for example, has permitted incumbents to use the 
powers of their office to crush their opponents.46 Their custody of the 
electoral machinery of the state also has furnished them with another 
powerful weapon. As my analysis of the Costa Rican case demonstrates, 
the temptations created by such arrangements proved to be too great for 
most incumbents to ignore. 
Until their presidential systems were reformed, Argentine, Chilean 
and Uruguayan politics also remained unstable. The power held by 
Argentine presidents to dismiss popularly elected governors, for example, 
is credited with aggravating the conflicts between government and 
opposition that led to the collapse of democracy in 1930.47 Civil wars and 
other types of conflict in Chile, for example, were often provoked by  
46 Fine studies of these problems are Brian Loveman, The Constitution of Tyranny: Regimes 
of Exception in Spanish America (Pittsburgh, 1994) and Diego Valades, La dictadura 
constitucional en América Latina (Mexico, D.F., 1974). 
47. Ann Louise Potter, ' The Failure of Democracy in Argentina, 1916-193o: An 
Institutional Perspective', Journal of Latin American Studies, vol. 13, no. i (1981) and 
Natalio R. Botana, El orden conservador : la politica argentina entre 1880-1916 (Buenos Aires, 
1979). Also, see N. Guillermo Molinelli, Presidentes y congresos en Argentina (Buenos 
Aires, 1991). 
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presidents who abused the powers of their office.48 A democratic regime 
became consolidated in Uruguay as incumbents shared power with their 
opponents and created an autonomous system of electoral courts in 
1925.49 
Underscoring the importance of institutional arrangements in shaping 
political behaviour does not deny the role played by social and economic 
conflicts in fomenting regime breakdowns. The absence of severe social 
cleavages in Costa Rican politics undoubtedly decreased the intensity of 
conflict over control of the state. Strife about the place of the Church in 
Chilean society, along with the emergence of urban labour unions and 
agrarian movements, only exacerbated the conflicts created by the struggle 
to retain or to gain control of the executive branch of government in 
Chile.50 What these studies and this article, however, indicate is that 
prevailing accounts emphasising the impact of e conomic under-
development and class cleavages on the development of democratic 
regimes need to be re-examined and perhaps even substantially modified.51
 
48 Julio Heise González, El periodo parlamentario, 1861-192f: democracia y gobierno 
representativo en el período parlamentario (Santiago, 198z) and J. Samuel Valenzuela, 
Democratización via reforma: la expansión del sufragio en Chile (Buenos Aires, 1985). 
49 Rolando Franco, Democracia `a la uruguaya' : análisis electoral, 1927-198, (Montevideo, 
1984); Hector Gros Espiell, La Corte Electoral del Uruguay (San José, 1990); Philip 
Taylor, Government and Politics of Uruguay (New Orleans, 1960). 
50 An analysis of the impact of these cleavages on Chilean politics is Timothy R. Scully, 
Rethinking the Center: Party Politics in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Chile (Stanford, 
1992). An analysis of Chilean presidentialism is Arturo Valenzuela, 'Political Parties 
and the Failure of Presidentialism in Chile: A Proposal for a Parliamentary Form of 
Government', in Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela (eds.), The Failure of Presidential 
Democracy. 
51 The most prominent sociological study is : Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber 
Stephens and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy. Also, see Ruth 
Berins Collier and David Collier, Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor 
Movement and Regime Dynamics in Latin America (Princeton, 1991). 
 
